lthough it was
equally important to keep William from getting a foothold till James
was further strengthened and Londonderry, then passing through its
famous siege, reduced; and although the French were superior to the
united English and Dutch on the seas in 1689 and 1690; nevertheless,
the English admiral Rooke was able, unmolested, to throw succors and
troops into Londonderry, and afterward landed Marshal Schomberg, with
a small army, near Carrickfergus. Rooke stopped intercourse between
Ireland and Scotland, where were many Stuart partisans, and then with
his small squadron passed along the east coast of Ireland, attempted
to burn the shipping in Dublin harbor, failing only through lack of
wind, and finally came off Cork, then occupied by James, took
possession of an island in the harbor, and returned in safety to the
Downs in October. These services, which raised the siege of
Londonderry and kept open the communications between England and
Ireland, extended throughout the summer months; nor was any attempt
made by the French to stop them. There can be little doubt that an
effective co-operation of the French fleet in the summer of 1689 would
have broken down all opposition to James in Ireland, by isolating that
country from England, with corresponding injury to William's power.

The following year the same strategic and political mistake was made.
It is the nature of an enterprise such as James's, dependent upon a
weaker people and foreign help, to lose strength if it does not
progress; but the chances were still in his favor, provided France
co-operated heartily, and above all, with her fleet. It is equally the
nature of a merely military navy like that of France to be strongest
at the beginning of hostilities; whereas that of the allied sea powers
grew daily stronger, drawing upon the vast resources of their merchant
shipping and their wealth. The disparity of force was still in favor
of France in 1690, but it was not as great as the year before. The
all-important question was where to direct it. There were two
principal courses, involving two views of naval strategy. The one was
to act against the allied fleet, whose defeat, if sufficiently severe,
might involve the fall of William's throne in England; the other was
to make the fleet subsidiary to the Irish campaign. The French king
decided upon the former, which was undoubtedly the proper course; but
there was no reason for neglecting, as he did, the important d