her than maritime;
while the gradual withdrawal of the great French fleets, by leaving
the allied navies without enemies on the sea, worked in the same way.
Furthermore, the efficiency of the English navy, which was double in
numbers that of the Dutch, was at this time at a low pitch; the
demoralizing effects of the reign of Charles II. could not be wholly
overcome during the three years of his brother's rule, and there was a
yet more serious cause of trouble growing out of the political state
of England. It has been said that James believed the naval officers
and seamen to be attached to his person; and, whether justly or
unjustly, this thought was also in the minds of the present rulers,
causing doubts of the loyalty and trustworthiness of many officers,
and tending to bring confusion into the naval administration. We are
told that "the complaints made by the merchants were extremely well
supported, and showed the folly of preferring unqualified men to that
board which directed the naval power of England; and yet the mischief
could not be amended, because the more experienced people who had been
long in the service were thought disaffected, and it appeared the
remedy might have proved worse than the disease."[74] Suspicion
reigned in the cabinet and the city, factions and irresolution among
the officers; and a man who was unfortunate or incapable in action
knew that the yet more serious charge of treason might follow his
misadventure.

After La Hougue, the direct military action of the allied navies was
exerted in three principal ways, the first being in attacks upon the
French ports, especially those in the Channel and near Brest. These
had rarely in view more than local injury and the destruction of
shipping, particularly in the ports whence the French privateers
issued; and although on some occasions the number of troops embarked
was large, William proposed to himself little more than the diversion
which such threats caused, by forcing Louis to take troops from the
field for coast defence. It may be said generally of all these
enterprises against the French coast, in this and later wars, that
they effected little, and even as a diversion did not weaken the
French armies to any great extent. If the French ports had been less
well defended, or French water-ways open into the heart of the
country, like our own Chesapeake and Delaware bays and the Southern
sounds, the result might have been different.

In the second