numbers, but which, from its position to windward, had the choice of
coming to close action or not, while with the remainder he fell in much
superior strength upon the English (Plate III., B). Paul Hoste says[48]
that Vice-Admiral d'Estrees, commanding the French, had taken measures
for tacking and breaking through the Dutch division opposed to him so
as to rejoin the Duke of York, the allied commander-in-chief. It may be
so, for D'Estrees was a very brave man, and not enough of a seaman to
appreciate the dangers of the attempt; but no such move was begun, and
both the English and Ruyter thought that the French rather avoided than
sought close action. Had D'Estrees, however, gone about, and attempted
to break through the line of experienced Dutchmen to windward of him
with the still raw seamen of France, the result would have been as
disastrous as that which overtook the Spanish admiral at the battle of
St. Vincent a hundred and twenty-five years later, when he tried to
reunite his broken fleet by breaking through the close order of Jervis
and Nelson. (See Plate III., a.) The truth, which gradually dawns
through a mass of conflicting statements, is, that the Duke of York,
though a fair seaman and a brave man, was not an able one; that his
fleet was not in good order and was thus surprised; that his orders
beforehand were not so precise as to make the French admiral
technically disobedient in taking the opposite tack from the
commander-in-chief, and so separating the squadrons; and that Ruyter
profited most ably by the surprise which he had himself prepared, and
by the further opportunity given him by the ineptness of his enemies.
Unless for circumstances that are not stated, the French admiral took
the right tack, with a northeast wind, for it led out to sea and would
give room for manoeuvring; had the Duke of York chosen the same, the
allied fleet would have gone out together, with only the disadvantage
of the wind and bad order. In that case, however, Ruyter could, and
probably would, have done just what he did at the Texel a year
later,--check the van, the French, with a small containing force, and
fall with the mass of his fleet upon the centre and rear. It is the
similarity of his action in both cases, under very different
conditions, that proves he intended at Southwold Bay merely to keep the
French in check while he destroyed the English.

In this battle, called indifferently Southwold Bay and Solebay, Ruyter
sh