ey are not
vital, and I shall ignore them.
Instead of first collecting together all the particulars constituting
a momentary thing, and then forming the series of successive sets,
we might have first collected together a series of successive aspects
related by the laws of dynamics, and then have formed the set of such
series related by the laws of perspective. To illustrate by the case of
an actor on the stage: our first plan was to collect together all the
aspects which he presents to different spectators at one time, and then
to form the series of such sets. Our second plan is first to collect
together all the aspects which he presents successively to a given
spectator, and then to do the same thing for the other spectators, thus
forming a set of series instead of a series of sets. The first plan
tells us what he does; the second the impressions he produces. This
second way of classifying particulars is one which obviously has more
relevance to psychology than the other. It is partly by this second
method of classification that we obtain definitions of one "experience"
or "biography" or "person." This method of classification is also
essential to the definition of sensations and images, as I shall
endeavour to prove later on. But we must first amplify the definition of
perspectives and biographies.
In our illustration of the actor, we spoke, for the moment, as though
each spectator's mind were wholly occupied by the one actor. If this
were the case, it might be possible to define the biography of one
spectator as a series of successive aspects of the actor related
according to the laws of dynamics. But in fact this is not the case.
We are at all times during our waking life receiving a variety of
impressions, which are aspects of a variety of things. We have to
consider what binds together two simultaneous sensations in one
person, or, more generally, any two occurrences which forte part of one
experience. We might say, adhering to the standpoint of physics, that
two aspects of different things belong to the same perspective when
they are in the same place. But this would not really help us, since a
"place" has not yet been defined. Can we define what is meant by saying
that two aspects are "in the same place," without introducing anything
beyond the laws of perspective and dynamics?
I do not feel sure whether it is possible to frame such a definition or
not; accordingly I shall not assume that it is possible, b
|