something abstract, like equality for example; it may be something
imaginary, like a golden mountain; or it may even be something
self-contradictory, like a round square. But in all these cases, so
he contends, the content exists when the thought exists, and is what
distinguishes it, as an occurrence, from other thoughts.

* See, e.g. his article: "Ueber Gegenstande hoherer Ordnung
und deren Verhaltniss zur inneren Wahrnehmung," "Zeitschrift
fur Psychologie and Physiologie der Sinnesorgane," vol. xxi,
pp. 182-272 (1899), especially pp. 185-8.

To make this theory concrete, let us suppose that you are thinking of
St. Paul's. Then, according to Meinong, we have to distinguish three
elements which are necessarily combined in constituting the one thought.
First, there is the act of thinking, which would be just the same
whatever you were thinking about. Then there is what makes the character
of the thought as contrasted with other thoughts; this is the content.
And finally there is St. Paul's, which is the object of your thought.
There must be a difference between the content of a thought and what it
is about, since the thought is here and now, whereas what it is about
may not be; hence it is clear that the thought is not identical with St.
Paul's. This seems to show that we must distinguish between content
and object. But if Meinong is right, there can be no thought without an
object: the connection of the two is essential. The object might exist
without the thought, but not the thought without the object: the three
elements of act, content and object are all required to constitute the
one single occurrence called "thinking of St. Paul's."

The above analysis of a thought, though I believe it to be mistaken, is
very useful as affording a schema in terms of which other theories can
be stated. In the remainder of the present lecture I shall state in
outline the view which I advocate, and show how various other views
out of which mine has grown result from modifications of the threefold
analysis into act, content and object.

The first criticism I have to make is that the ACT seems unnecessary and
fictitious. The occurrence of the content of a thought constitutes
the occurrence of the thought. Empirically, I cannot discover anything
corresponding to the supposed act; and theoretically I cannot see that
it is indispensable. We say: "_I_ think so-and-so," and this word "I"
suggests that thinking is the ac