that the world is so organic, so dove-tailed, that from any
one portion the whole can be inferred, as the complete skeleton of an
extinct animal can be inferred from one bone. But the logic by which
this supposed organic nature of the world is nominally demonstrated
appears to realists, as it does to me, to be faulty. They argue that,
if we cannot know the physical world directly, we cannot really know
any thing outside our own minds: the rest of the world may be merely our
dream. This is a dreary view, and they there fore seek ways of escaping
from it. Accordingly they maintain that in knowledge we are in direct
contact with objects, which may be, and usually are, outside our own
minds. No doubt they are prompted to this view, in the first place, by
bias, namely, by the desire to think that they can know of the existence
of a world outside themselves. But we have to consider, not what led
them to desire the view, but whether their arguments for it are valid.

There are two different kinds of realism, according as we make a thought
consist of act and object, or of object alone. Their difficulties are
different, but neither seems tenable all through. Take, for the sake of
definiteness, the remembering of a past event. The remembering occurs
now, and is therefore necessarily not identical with the past event.
So long as we retain the act, this need cause no difficulty. The act
of remembering occurs now, and has on this view a certain essential
relation to the past event which it remembers. There is no LOGICAL
objection to this theory, but there is the objection, which we spoke
of earlier, that the act seems mythical, and is not to be found by
observation. If, on the other hand, we try to constitute memory without
the act, we are driven to a content, since we must have something that
happens NOW, as opposed to the event which happened in the past. Thus,
when we reject the act, which I think we must, we are driven to a theory
of memory which is more akin to idealism. These arguments, however, do
not apply to sensation. It is especially sensation, I think, which is
considered by those realists who retain only the object.* Their views,
which are chiefly held in America, are in large measure derived from
William James, and before going further it will be well to consider
the revolutionary doctrine which he advocated. I believe this doctrine
contains important new truth, and what I shall have to say will be in a
considerable me