hat discomfort normally belongs to the belief that we
desire such-and-such a thing that we do not possess. Thus what was
originally a false opinion as to the object of a desire acquires a
certain truth: the false opinion generates a secondary subsidiary
desire, which nevertheless becomes real. Let us take an illustration.
Suppose you have been jilted in a way which wounds your vanity. Your
natural impulsive desire will be of the sort expressed in Donne's poem:
When by thy scorn, O Murderess, I am dead,
in which he explains how he will haunt the poor lady as a ghost, and
prevent her from enjoying a moment's peace. But two things stand in
the way of your expressing yourself so naturally: on the one hand, your
vanity, which will not acknowledge how hard you are hit; on the other
hand, your conviction that you are a civilized and humane person,
who could not possibly indulge so crude a desire as revenge. You will
therefore experience a restlessness which will at first seem quite
aimless, but will finally resolve itself in a conscious desire to change
your profession, or go round the world, or conceal your identity and
live in Putney, like Arnold Bennett's hero. Although the prime cause of
this desire is a false judgment as to your previous unconscious desire,
yet the new conscious desire has its own derivative genuineness, and may
influence your actions to the extent of sending you round the world.
The initial mistake, however, will have effects of two kinds. First,
in uncontrolled moments, under the influence of sleepiness or drink
or delirium, you will say things calculated to injure the faithless
deceiver. Secondly, you will find travel disappointing, and the East
less fascinating than you had hoped--unless, some day, you hear that the
wicked one has in turn been jilted. If this happens, you will believe
that you feel sincere sympathy, but you will suddenly be much more
delighted than before with the beauties of tropical islands or the
wonders of Chinese art. A secondary desire, derived from a false
judgment as to a primary desire, has its own power of influencing
action, and is therefore a real desire according to our definition.
But it has not the same power as a primary desire of bringing thorough
satisfaction when it is realized; so long as the primary desire remains
unsatisfied, restlessness continues in spite of the secondary desire's
success. Hence arises a belief in the vanity of human wishes: the vain
wi
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