es not require
prevision. This, though not strictly capable of being PROVED by
observation, is irresistibly suggested by the most obvious phenomena.
Who can believe, for example, that a new-born baby is aware of the
necessity of food for preserving life? Or that insects, in laying eggs,
are concerned for the preservation of their species? The essence of
instinct, one might say, is that it provides a mechanism for
acting without foresight in a manner which is usually advantageous
biologically. It is partly for this reason that it is so important to
understand the fundamental position of instinct in prompting both animal
and human behaviour.

LECTURE III. DESIRE AND FEELING

Desire is a subject upon which, if I am not mistaken, true views can
only be arrived at by an almost complete reversal of the ordinary
unreflecting opinion. It is natural to regard desire as in its essence
an attitude towards something which is imagined, not actual; this
something is called the END or OBJECT of the desire, and is said to be
the PURPOSE of any action resulting from the desire. We think of the
content of the desire as being just like the content of a belief, while
the attitude taken up towards the content is different. According to
this theory, when we say: "I hope it will rain," or "I expect it will
rain," we express, in the first case, a desire, and in the second, a
belief, with an identical content, namely, the image of rain. It would
be easy to say that, just as belief is one kind of feeling in relation
to this content, so desire is another kind. According to this view, what
comes first in desire is something imagined, with a specific feeling
related to it, namely, that specific feeling which we call "desiring"
it. The discomfort associated with unsatisfied desire, and the actions
which aim at satisfying desire, are, in this view, both of them effects
of the desire. I think it is fair to say that this is a view against
which common sense would not rebel; nevertheless, I believe it to be
radically mistaken. It cannot be refuted logically, but various facts
can be adduced which make it gradually less simple and plausible, until
at last it turns out to be easier to abandon it wholly and look at the
matter in a totally different way.

The first set of facts to be adduced against the common sense view of
desire are those studied by psycho-analysis. In all human beings, but
most markedly in those suffering from hysteria and certa