ls and
savages, though civilized people are supposed to have discarded it. We
sometimes find also a whole set of false beliefs, of such a kind as to
persuade the patient that his actions are really a means to A, when in
fact they are a means to B. For example, we have an impulse to inflict
pain upon those whom we hate; we therefore believe that they are wicked,
and that punishment will reform them. This belief enables us to act upon
the impulse to inflict pain, while believing that we are acting upon
the desire to lead sinners to repentance. It is for this reason that the
criminal law has been in all ages more severe than it would have been if
the impulse to ameliorate the criminal had been what really inspired
it. It seems simple to explain such a state of affairs as due to
"self-deception," but this explanation is often mythical. Most people,
in thinking about punishment, have had no more need to hide their
vindictive impulses from themselves than they have had to hide
the exponential theorem. Our impulses are not patent to a casual
observation, but are only to be discovered by a scientific study of our
actions, in the course of which we must regard ourselves as objectively
as we should the motions of the planets or the chemical reactions of a
new element.
The study of animals reinforces this conclusion, and is in many ways
the best preparation for the analysis of desire. In animals we are
not troubled by the disturbing influence of ethical considerations. In
dealing with human beings, we are perpetually distracted by being told
that such-and-such a view is gloomy or cynical or pessimistic: ages of
human conceit have built up such a vast myth as to our wisdom and virtue
that any intrusion of the mere scientific desire to know the facts is
instantly resented by those who cling to comfortable illusions. But no
one cares whether animals are virtuous or not, and no one is under the
delusion that they are rational. Moreover, we do not expect them to be
so "conscious," and are prepared to admit that their instincts prompt
useful actions without any prevision of the ends which they achieve. For
all these reasons, there is much in the analysis of mind which is more
easily discovered by the study of animals than by the observation of
human beings.
We all think that, by watching the behaviour of animals, we can discover
more or less what they desire. If this is the case--and I fully agree
that it is--desire must be capable
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