thing that it is
generally supposed to be, nor is there any reason to think that in the
physical world there is anything even remotely analogous to what will is
supposed to be. If we could find one antecedent, and only one, that was
QUITE invariable, we could call that one THE cause without introducing
any notion derived from mistaken ideas about will. But in fact we cannot
find any antecedent that we know to be quite invariable, and we can find
many that are nearly so. For example, men leave a factory for dinner
when the hooter sounds at twelve o'clock. You may say the hooter is
THE cause of their leaving. But innumerable other hooters in other
factories, which also always sound at twelve o'clock, have just as
good a right to be called the cause. Thus every event has many nearly
invariable antecedents, and therefore many antecedents which may be
called its cause.

The laws of traditional physics, in the form in which they deal with
movements of matter or electricity, have an apparent simplicity which
somewhat conceals the empirical character of what they assert. A piece
of matter, as it is known empirically, is not a single existing thing,
but a system of existing things. When several people simultaneously see
the same table, they all see something different; therefore "the" table,
which they are supposed all to see, must be either a hypothesis or
a construction. "The" table is to be neutral as between different
observers: it does not favour the aspect seen by one man at the expense
of that seen by another. It was natural, though to my mind mistaken, to
regard the "real" table as the common cause of all the appearances which
the table presents (as we say) to different observers. But why should we
suppose that there is some one common cause of all these appearances? As
we have just seen, the notion of "cause" is not so reliable as to allow
us to infer the existence of something that, by its very nature, can
never be observed.

Instead of looking for an impartial source, we can secure neutrality by
the equal representation of all parties. Instead of supposing that there
is some unknown cause, the "real" table, behind the different sensations
of those who are said to be looking at the table, we may take the
whole set of these sensations (together possibly with certain other
particulars) as actually BEING the table. That is to say, the table
which is neutral as between different observers (actual and possible)
is the se