shes are those that are secondary, but mistaken beliefs prevent us
from realizing that they are secondary.

What may, with some propriety, be called self-deception arises through
the operation of desires for beliefs. We desire many things which it is
not in our power to achieve: that we should be universally popular and
admired, that our work should be the wonder of the age, and that the
universe should be so ordered as to bring ultimate happiness to all,
though not to our enemies until they have repented and been purified
by suffering. Such desires are too large to be achieved through our own
efforts. But it is found that a considerable portion of the satisfaction
which these things would bring us if they were realized is to be
achieved by the much easier operation of believing that they are or
will be realized. This desire for beliefs, as opposed to desire for the
actual facts, is a particular case of secondary desire, and, like all
secondary desire its satisfaction does not lead to a complete cessation
of the initial discomfort. Nevertheless, desire for beliefs, as opposed
to desire for facts, is exceedingly potent both individually and
socially. According to the form of belief desired, it is called vanity,
optimism, or religion. Those who have sufficient power usually imprison
or put to death any one who tries to shake their faith in their own
excellence or in that of the universe; it is for this reason that
seditious libel and blasphemy have always been, and still are, criminal
offences.

It is very largely through desires for beliefs that the primitive
nature of desire has become so hidden, and that the part played by
consciousness has been so confusing and so exaggerated.

We may now summarize our analysis of desire and feeling.

A mental occurrence of any kind--sensation, image, belief, or
emotion--may be a cause of a series of actions, continuing, unless
interrupted, until some more or less definite state of affairs is
realized. Such a series of actions we call a "behaviour-cycle." The
degree of definiteness may vary greatly: hunger requires only food in
general, whereas the sight of a particular piece of food raises a desire
which requires the eating of that piece of food. The property of causing
such a cycle of occurrences is called "discomfort"; the property of the
mental occurrences in which the cycle ends is called "pleasure." The
actions constituting the cycle must not be purely mechanical, i.e. they