frustrated impulses that I would find the biological
basis of the unfulfilled wish. Such 'wishes' need never have been
'conscious,' and NEED NEVER HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED INTO FREUD'S REALM
OF THE UNCONSCIOUS. It may be inferred from this that there is no
particular reason for applying the term 'wish' to such tendencies"(p.
485).
One of the merits of the general analysis of mind which we shall
be concerned with in the following lectures is that it removes the
atmosphere of mystery from the phenomena brought to light by the
psycho-analysts. Mystery is delightful, but unscientific, since it
depends upon ignorance. Man has developed out of the animals, and
there is no serious gap between him and the amoeba. Something closely
analogous to knowledge and desire, as regards its effects on behaviour,
exists among animals, even where what we call "consciousness" is hard
to believe in; something equally analogous exists in ourselves in cases
where no trace of "consciousness" can be found. It is therefore
natural to suppose that, what ever may be the correct definition of
"consciousness," "consciousness" is not the essence of life or mind. In
the following lectures, accordingly, this term will disappear until we
have dealt with words, when it will re-emerge as mainly a trivial and
unimportant outcome of linguistic habits.
LECTURE II. INSTINCT AND HABIT
In attempting to understand the elements out of which mental phenomena
are compounded, it is of the greatest importance to remember that from
the protozoa to man there is nowhere a very wide gap either in structure
or in behaviour. From this fact it is a highly probable inference that
there is also nowhere a very wide mental gap. It is, of course, POSSIBLE
that there may be, at certain stages in evolution, elements which are
entirely new from the standpoint of analysis, though in their nascent
form they have little influence on behaviour and no very marked
correlatives in structure. But the hypothesis of continuity in mental
development is clearly preferable if no psychological facts make it
impossible. We shall find, if I am not mistaken, that there are no facts
which refute the hypothesis of mental continuity, and that, on the other
hand, this hypothesis affords a useful test of suggested theories as to
the nature of mind.
The hypothesis of mental continuity throughout organic evolution may be
used in two different ways. On the one hand, it may be held that we
have mo
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