hem by law of the power of bequeathing
the surplus.

The rights of inheritance obviously coincide precisely with those of
bequest. Just so much as the testator parts with the legatee obtains.
When the bequest is unconditional, the new owner whom it creates steps
into the precise position which the previous owner has vacated. Often,
however, a legacy is qualified by conditions, and, among others, by
this, that the property bequeathed shall be held in trust for certain
purposes. Now, if these purposes be socially noxious, society need not
hesitate to set aside the will that has provided for them. Quite
justifiably, society might annul the testamentary endowment of a
hospital for fleas and lice, such as Bishop Heber, in his Indian tour,
found existing at Baroach and at Surat, because those particular insect
pests could scarcely be retained within the walls of their infirmary.
Perhaps, too, society might be justified in similarly preventing the
endowment of a hospital for superannuated dogs and cats; whether it
would or not depending mainly on the awkward question whether such
inferior animals have any rights inconsistent with human interests. Be
this as it may, however, where human interests alone are concerned, the
rights of conditional heirship present no ethical difficulty. When it is
for purposes socially innocuous and affecting human beings alone that
property is left in trust, it cannot be equitably diverted from those
purposes without the consent of all the individuals whom the
testamentary arrangements were intended to affect. It matters not how
whimsical or preposterous the object enjoined may be; not even though it
be a periodical dinner, cooked after the manner of the ancients, like
the nauseous one at which Peregrine Pickle assisted; or instruction in
alchemy or in Hindoo astronomy, or in the art of walking on one's head.
Not until there remain no persons at once entitled under the will, and
also wishing to partake of the banquet or the instruction, can one or
the other be equitably discontinued? As long as there are any such
persons left, to stop, without their consent and without adequately
compensating them, arrangements, rights in which have been vested in
them by bequest, would be as palpable a violation of justice as to pick
their pockets of sums equivalent to their several interests, real or
supposed, in the arrangements.

If scrupulous adherence to the principle thus laid down would heavily
shackle th