ussed, and
against which, notwithstanding the singular fascination it evidently
possesses for some minds, the moral sense of a much larger number
indignantly revolts, rightly apprehending that its establishment would
be subversive of all morality. For, if the actions of men are governed
by 'eternal and immutable laws,' men cannot be free agents; and where
there is not free agency there cannot be moral responsibility. Nor are
the apprehensions entertained on this score to be allayed by the answer,
ingenious as it is, which has been given to them[23] by one of the
ablest and most judicious apologists for the new creed. It is true that
human actions can be said to be 'governed' only in the same metaphorical
sense as that in which we speak of the laws of nature, which do not
really govern anything, but merely describe the invariable order in
which natural phenomena have been observed to occur. It is true that the
discovery of invariable regularity in human affairs, supposing such a
discovery to have been made, would not prove that there was any
necessity for such regularity. It is conceivable that the orbs of heaven
may be intelligent beings, possessing full power to change or to arrest
their own course, and moving constantly in the same orbits merely
because it pleases them to do so. Invariable regularity, therefore,
would be perfectly consistent with free agency. All this is perfectly
just, but it is also altogether beside the question. The offence given
by the writers on whose behalf the apology is set up consists not so
much in their asserting that there are, as in their insisting that there
must be, uniformity and regularity in human affairs; or, as Mr. Buckle
expresses it, that social phenomena 'are the results of large and
general causes which, working on the aggregate of society, _must_
produce certain consequences, without regard to the volition of the
particular men of whom the society is composed.' Now, though free agency
may co-exist with _invariable_ regularity, it obviously cannot co-exist
with _necessary_ regularity, which, consequently, is incompatible
likewise with moral responsibility. If men are compelled by the force of
circumstances, or by any force, to move only in one direction, they
cannot be responsible for not moving in a different direction. Nor is it
more to the purpose to undertake a subtle analysis of the nature of
causation, and to explain that it does not, properly speaking, involve
compulsion
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