and treating it as a thing for which there is
no evidence. When Johnson silenced Boswell's chatter with the words,
'Sir, we know our will is free and there's an end on't,' he expressed a
great truth in language not the less philosophically accurate on account
of its colloquial curtness. The consciousness possessed by an agent
about to perform an act, that he is at liberty to perform it or not, is
really conclusive evidence that the act is free. For it matters not a
jot whether consciousness be 'an independent faculty,' or whether--as,
Mr. Buckle reminds us, 'is the opinion of some of the ablest
thinkers'--it be not merely 'a state or condition of the mind.' If
consciousness be a condition of the mind, so also is perception; but
perception, whatever else it be, is also that which makes us acquainted
with external phenomena, just as consciousness is that which makes us
acquainted with internal emotions. The two informants, it is true, are
not equally trustworthy. Perception often deceives us, but
consciousness, never. We often fancy we perceive what we do not
perceive. We may fancy we see a ghost, when we are merely mocked by an
optical illusion, or we may mistake the impalpable imagery of the Fata
Morgana for solid objects, or the rumbling of a cart for thunder. But
consciousness is infallible. We cannot fancy we experience an emotion
which we do not experience. We cannot fancy we are glad when we are not
glad, or sorry when we are not sorry, or hopeful when in despair; and to
pretend that we can possibly be conscious of willing when we are not
willing, would be as absurd as to meet the _cogito, ergo sum_ of
Descartes, with the reply that, perhaps, we do not really think, but
only think we think.

Freewill, then, being an indisputable reality, how can it be reconciled
with foreknowledge? There can be no more conclusive way of showing that
the two things are capable of co-existing than to point to an example of
their actual co-existence, and such an example is afforded by the idea
of Infinite Power. Omnipotence, which by its nature implies freewill,
comprehends also Omniscience. Omnipotence can do anything whatsoever
which does not involve a contradiction; but even Omnipotence can do
nothing which Omniscience does not foresee. It can, indeed, do
whatsoever it pleases; but Omniscience foresees precisely what it will
be pleased to do. With unbounded liberty to choose any course of action,
it can yet choose no course which