ty, omnipotence must possess completest freedom of will. Yet even
the Will of Omnipotence is subject to the despotism of causation. Divine
perfection cannot but be at all times affected in modes as exactly
corresponding with its own excellence as human imperfection is in modes
corresponding with its deficiencies, and the movements of the Divine
Mind cannot but correspond with the affections of the Divine Mind. Those
movements are not unmeaning, purposeless, wayward. They, too, have their
appropriate springs, and proceed by regular process from legitimate
causes, the chief of those causes being the infinite perfection of the
Divine Nature. Divine Power cannot then, any more than human, be
directed by its owner's will to purposes against which its owner's
nature revolts. But is this inability a matter to lament over? Those
must be greatly at a loss for a grievance who make one of its being
impossible for them to will things which they have over-ruling reasons
for not willing. Besides, does man, in order to believe himself free,
require more freedom than his Maker? The disciple is not above his
master, nor the servant above his lord. Surely it is sufficient that
the disciple be as his master, and the servant as his lord.[25]

The fact, then, that human conduct is subject to causation, and may by
adequate intelligence be predicted in its minutest details until the end
of time, no more proves that it is governed by invariable laws, which
act irrespectively of human volitions, than the corresponding fact with
reference to Divine conduct impairs the freedom of the Divine Will.
There is no one living to whom such a doctrine--degrading man, as it
does, into a helpless puppet, robbing him of all moral responsibility
and of every motive for either exertion or self-control--can be more
utterly repugnant than to Mr. Mill, who nevertheless, although
dissenting from Mr. Buckle's more extreme opinions, makes use of some
expressions which may be construed into a qualified approval of his
general views. Even Mr. Mill speaks of 'human volitions as depending on
scientific laws,' thereby implying that the circumstances from which
human motives and, consequently, human actions result are continually
recurring with a certain regularity. He speaks of 'general laws
affecting communities, which are indeed modified in their action by
special causes affecting individuals, but which, if their effects could
be observed over a field sufficiently wide