ples might be
cited of nations remaining patient under an iron despotism, and perhaps
also of campaigns lost by armies with every advantage of skill, numbers,
and discipline on their side. No better specimen can be given of what
are popularly spoken of as historical laws than one propounded by Mr. C.
Merivale, whose careful study of Roman annals has taught him to regard
it as 'a condition of permanent dominion that conquerors should absorb
the conquered gradually into their own body, by extending, as
circumstances arise, a share in their own exclusive privileges to the
masses from whom they have torn their original independence.' The
principle thus laid down is of great value, but it must not be mistaken
for an index pointing unerringly to a goal which will certainly be
obtained by following its direction. At least the offer of Austrian
citizenship had no perceptible effect in overcoming the exclusiveness of
Hungarian nationality; nor in inducing Venetia to become a willing
member of a Teutonic Federation, and to lend the same assistance to the
House of Hapsburg, as Gaul and Spain did to the Caesars, in suppressing
insurrection on the banks of the Danube. History supplies many
principles similar to the one evolved by Mr. Merivale, all more or less
useful for the guidance of the statesman. So far as they are just, they
indicate the results which would spring from the adoption of certain
lines of policy, unless something unforeseen should happen. It is true
that something unforeseen is almost sure to happen and to divert or
impede the course which events would otherwise take; but still, it is
most important to be able to perceive clearly the influence exerted by
certain causes, how much soever that influence may be disturbed by other
causes; since, if it does nothing else, it will at least prevent the
disturbing causes from producing what would otherwise have been their
full effect. On principles which indicate only a few out of many causes
in simultaneous operation, it is evident that nothing deserving to be
called predictions can be founded; but from them, nevertheless--inasmuch
as they teach that some causes act for good and others for evil, as far
as their action extends--practical rules of government may be deduced.
Such rules, however, which at best can only furnish a loose and shifting
basis for doubtful conjectures, stand without the confines of positive
knowledge; they occupy a middle-ground between science and nes
|