his principles, wished entirely to
disregard the question of law; he was equally indifferent to the Treaty
of London, the hereditary rights of Augustenburg, or the chartered
privileges of the Duchies. He wished to consult the inhabitants and
allow each village to vote whether it wished to be German or Danish;
thus, districts in the north where Danish was spoken would then be
incorporated in Denmark; the whole of Holstein and the south of
Schleswig would be permanently united to Germany, and by preference to
Prussia. These revolutionary principles of Napoleon were in the eyes of
the Austrian statesmen criminal, for if applied consistently not only
would Austria be deprived of Venetia, but the whole Empire would be
dissolved. It required all Bismarck's ingenuity to maintain the alliance
with Austria, which was still necessary to him, and at the same time to
keep Napoleon's friendship by giving his assent to doctrines that would
be so convenient to Prussia.
In considering Bismarck's diplomatic work we must not suppose that he
ever deceived himself into thinking that he would be able clearly to
foresee all that would happen; he knew too well the uncertain nature of
the pieces with which he had to deal: no one could quite foretell, for
instance, the result of the struggle which was going on in the English
Ministry or the votes of the House of Commons; equally impossible was it
to build on the assurances of Napoleon.
"The longer I work at politics," he said, "the smaller is my
belief in human calculation. I look at the affair according to my
human understanding, but gratitude for God's assistance so far,
raises in me the confidence that the Lord is able to turn our
errors to our own good; that I experience daily to my wholesome
humiliation."
This time he had been mistaken in his forecast. In a despatch of May 23d
to Austria he suggested two solutions,--the Augustenburg succession, and
annexation by Prussia; he inclined towards the former, though, as he
said, if the Prince was to be recognised,
"it would be imperatively necessary to obtain guarantees for a
Conservative administration, and some security that the Duchies
should not become the home of democratic agitations."
As he said elsewhere, "Kiel must not become a second Gotha." He no doubt
anticipated that Austria would refuse this first alternative; then the
annexation by Prussia would naturally arise for discussion. Had Austria
been consisten
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