Press, and while the
Prussians daily became more unpopular in Schleswig the Austrians by
their leniency won the affection of Holstein. At the end of January,
they even allowed a mass meeting, which was attended by over 4000 men,
to be held at Altona. This made a very unfavourable impression on the
King, and any action of Austria that offended the King was most useful
to Bismarck. "Bismarck is using all his activity to inspire the King
with his own views and feelings," wrote Benedetti, the French
Ambassador, at this time. At the end of January he felt sufficiently
secure to protest seriously against the Austrian action in Holstein.
"Why," he asked, "had they left the alliance against our common enemy,
the Revolution?" Austria, in return, refused peremptorily to allow
Bismarck any voice in the administration of Holstein. Bismarck, when the
despatch was read to him, answered curtly that he must consider that
henceforth the relations of the two Powers had lost their intimate
character; "we are as we were before the Danish war, neither worse nor
better." He sent no answer to the Austrian despatch and ceased to
discuss with them the affairs of the Duchies.
This was a fair warning to Austria and it was understood; they took it
as an intimation that hostilities were intended, and from this day began
quietly to make their preparations. As soon as they did this, they were
given into Bismarck's hands; the Prussians, owing to the admirable
organisation of the army, could prepare for war in a fortnight or three
weeks' time less than the Austrians would require; Austria to be secure
must therefore begin to arm first; as soon as she did so the Prussian
Government would be able, with full protestation of innocence, to point
to the fact that they had not moved a man, and then to begin their own
mobilisation, not apparently for offence but, as it were, to protect
themselves from an unprovoked attack. In a minute of February 22d Moltke
writes that it would be better for political reasons not to mobilise
yet; then they would appear to put Austria in the wrong; Austria had now
100,000 men in Bohemia and it would be impossible to undertake any
offensive movement against Prussia with less than 150,000 or 200,000; to
collect these at least six weeks would be required, and the preparations
could not be concealed. Six days later a great council was held in
Berlin. "A war with Austria must come sooner or later; it is wiser to
undertake it now,
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