had passed since the great battle, when a telegram from
Napoleon was placed in the King's hands informing him that Austria had
requested France's mediation, that Venetia had been surrendered to
France, and inviting the King to conclude an armistice. Immediately
afterwards came the news that the surrender of Venetia to France had
been published in the _Moniteur_.

If this meant anything, it meant that Napoleon intended to stop the
further progress of the Prussian army, to rescue Austria, and to dictate
the terms of peace; it could not be doubted that he would be prepared to
support his mediation by arms, and in a few days they might expect to
hear that the French corps were being stationed on the frontier. What
was to be done? Bismarck neither doubted nor hesitated; it was
impossible to refuse French mediation. West Germany was almost
undefended, the whole of the southern States were still unconquered;
however imperfect the French military preparations might be, it was
impossible to run such a risk. At his advice the King at once sent a
courteous answer accepting the French proposal. He was more disposed to
this because in doing so he really bound himself to nothing. He accepted
the principle of French mediation; but he was still free to discuss and
refuse the special terms which might be offered. He said that he was
willing to accept an armistice, but it was only on condition that the
preliminaries of peace were settled before hostilities ceased, and to
them the King could not agree except after consultation with the King of
Italy. It was a friendly answer, which cost nothing, and meanwhile the
army continued to advance. An Austrian request for an armistice was
refused; Vienna was now the goal; Napoleon, if he wished to stop them,
must take the next move, must explain the terms of peace he wished to
secure, and shew by what measures he was prepared to enforce them.

By his prompt action, Bismarck, who knew Napoleon well, hoped to escape
the threatened danger. We shall see with what address he used the
situation, so that the vacillation of France became to him more useful
than even her faithful friendship would have been, for now he felt
himself free from all ties of gratitude. Whatever services France might
do to Prussia she could henceforth look to him for no voluntary
recompense. Napoleon had deceived him; he would henceforward have no
scruples in deceiving Napoleon. He had entered on the war relying on the
friendshi