gnorant
of the matter and that it did not exist for them." This was the only
answer to be got; in a despatch sent on the 11th to the Prussian agents
in Germany, Bismarck repeated the assertion. "The matter has nothing to
do with Prussia. The Prussian Government has always considered and
treated this affair as one in which Spain and the selected candidate are
alone concerned." This was literally true, for it had never been brought
before the Prussian Ministry, and no doubt the records of the office
would contain no allusion to it; the majority of the Ministers were
absolutely ignorant of it.

Of course M. de Sourds did not believe Herr von Thiele's statement, and
his Government was not satisfied with the explanation; the excitement in
Paris was increasing; it was fomented by the agents of the Ministry, and
in answer to an interpolation in the Chamber, the Duc de Grammont on the
6th declared that the election of the Prince was inadmissible; he
trusted to the wisdom of the Prussian and the friendship of the Spanish
people not to proceed in it, but if his hope were frustrated they would
know how to do their duty. They were not obliged to endure that a
foreign Power by setting one of its Princes on the throne of Charles V.
should destroy the balance of power and endanger the interests and
honour of France. He hoped this would not happen; they relied on the
wisdom of the German and the friendship of the Spanish people to avoid
it; but if it were necessary, then, strong in the support of the nation
and the Chamber, they knew how to fulfil their duty without hesitation
or weakness.

The French Ministry hereby publicly declared that they held the Prussian
Government responsible for the election, and they persisted in demanding
the withdrawal, not from Spain, but from Prussia; Prim had suggested
that as the Foreign Office refused to discuss the matter, Grammont
should approach the King personally. Benedetti received instructions to
go to the King at Ems and request him to order or advise the Prince to
withdraw. At first Grammont wished him also to see the Prince himself;
on second thoughts he forbade this, for, as he said, it was of the first
importance that the messages should be conveyed by the King; he was
determined to use the opportunity for the humiliation of Germany.

If it was the desire of the French in this way to establish the
complicity of Prussia, it was imperative that the Prussian Government
should not allow the