their holidays. There was no danger in doing so; the
army was so well prepared that they could afford quietly to await what
the French would do. What Bismarck's plans and hopes were we do not
know; during these days he preserved silence; the violence of the French
gave him a further reason for refusing to enter into any discussion.
When, however, he heard of Benedetti's visit to Ems he became uneasy; he
feared that the King would compromise himself; he feared that the French
would succeed in their endeavour to inflict a diplomatic defeat on
Prussia. He proposed to go to Ems to support the King, and on the 12th
left Varzin; that night he arrived in Berlin. There he received the news
that the Prince of Hohenzollern, on behalf of his son, had announced
his withdrawal.
The retirement was probably the spontaneous act of the Prince and his
father; the decisive influence was the fear lest the enmity of Napoleon
might endanger the position of the Prince of Roumania. Everyone was
delighted; the cloud of war was dispelled; two men only were
dissatisfied--Bismarck and Grammont. It was the severest check which
Bismarck's policy had yet received; he had persuaded the Prince to
accept against his will; he had persuaded the King reluctantly to keep
the negotiations secret from Napoleon; however others might disguise the
truth, he knew that they had had to retreat from an untenable position,
and retreat before the noisy insults of the French Press and the open
menace of the French Government; his anger was increased by the fact
that neither the King nor the Prince had in this crisis acted as he
would have wished.
We have no authoritative statement as to the course he himself would
have pursued; he had, according to his own statement, advised the King
not to receive the French Ambassador; probably he wished that the Prince
should declare that as the Spaniards had offered him the crown and he
had accepted it, he could not now withdraw unless he were asked to do so
by Spain; the attempt of Grammont to fasten a quarrel on Prussia would
have been deprived of any responsible pretext; he would have been
compelled to bring pressure to bear on the Spaniards, with all the
dangers that that course would involve. We may suspect that he had
advised this course and that his advice had been rejected. However this
may be, Bismarck felt the reverse so keenly that it seemed to him
impossible he could any longer remain Minister, unless he could obtain
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