and he was not the man easily to
reconcile himself to a less favourable solution. At the same time that
he wrote this letter he sent orders that Falkenstein should quickly
occupy all the territory north of the Main.

It is important to notice the date at which this letter was sent. It
shews us that these proposals were Bismarck's own. Attempts have often
been made since to suggest that the policy of annexation was not his,
but was forced on him by the King, or by the military powers, or by the
nation. This was not the case. He appeals indeed to public opinion, but
public opinion, had it been asked, would really have demanded, not the
dethronement of the Kings of Hanover and Saxony, but the unity of all
Germany; and we know that Bismarck would never pursue what he thought a
dangerous policy simply because public opinion demanded it. It has also
been said that the dethronement of the King of Hanover was the natural
result of the obstinacy of himself and his advisers, and his folly in
going to Vienna to appeal there to the help of the Austrian Emperor.

This also is not true. We find that Bismarck has determined on this
policy some days before the King had left Thuringia. This, like all he
did, was the deliberate result of the consideration: What would tend
most to the growth of Prussian power? He had to consider three
alternatives: that these States should be compelled to come into a union
with Prussia on the terms that the Princes should hand over the command
of their forces to the Prussian King, but he knew that the King of
Hanover would never consent to this, and probably the King of Saxony
would also refuse; he might also require the reigning Kings to abdicate
in place of their sons; or he might leave them with considerable
freedom, but cripple their power by taking away part of their territory.
These solutions seemed to him undesirable because they would leave
dynasties, who would naturally be hostile, jealous, and suspicious, with
the control of large powers of government. Surely it would be better,
safer, and wiser to sweep them away altogether. It may be objected that
there was no ground in justice for so doing. This is true, and Bismarck
has never pretended that there was. He has left it to the writers of the
Prussian Press to justify an action which was based purely on policy, by
the pretence that it was the due recompense of the crimes of the rival
dynasties.

Sybel says that Bismarck determined on these ter