ms because they were
those which would be most acceptable to France; that he would have
preferred at once to secure the unity of the whole of Germany, but that
from his knowledge of French thought and French character he foresaw
that this would be possible only after another war, and he did not wish
to risk the whole. So far as our information goes, it is against this
hypothesis; it is rather true to say that he used the danger of French
interference as a means of persuading the King to adopt a policy which
was naturally repugnant to him. It is true that these terms would be
agreeable to Napoleon. It would appear in France and in Europe as if it
was French power which had persuaded Prussia to stop at the Main and to
spare Austria; Bismarck did not mind that, because what was pleasant to
France was convenient to him. He knew also that the proposal to annex
the conquered territories would be very agreeable to Napoleon; the
dethronement of old-established dynasties might be regarded as a
delicate compliment to the principles he had always maintained and to
the traditional policy of his house. If, however, we wish to find
Bismarck's own motives, we must remember that before the war broke out
he had in his mind some such division of Germany; he knew that it would
be impossible at once to unite the whole in a firm union. If Bavaria
were to be included in the new Confederation they would lose in harmony
what they gained in extent. As he said in his drastic way:
"We cannot use these Ultramontanes, and we must not swallow more
than we can digest. We will not fall into the blunder of
Piedmont, which has been more weakened than strengthened by the
annexation of Naples."
Of course he could not express this openly, and even now German writers
obscure the thought, for in Germany, as in Italy, the desire for unity
was so powerful that it was difficult to pardon any statesman who did
not take the most immediate path to this result. It was fortunate for
Germany that Bismarck was strong enough not to do so, for the
Confederation of the north could be founded and confirmed before the
Catholic and hostile south was included. The prize was in his hands; he
deliberately refused to pick it up.
Supposing, however, that, after all, France would not accept the terms
he suggested--during the anxious days which passed, this contingency was
often before him. It was not till the 14th that Goltz was able to send
him any decisive informa
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