tion, for the very good reason that Napoleon had
not until then made up his own mind. Bismarck's anxiety was increased by
the arrival of Benedetti. He had received instructions to follow the
King, and, after undergoing the discomfort of a hasty journey in the
rear of the Prussian army, reached headquarters on the 10th at Zwittau.
He was taken straight to Bismarck's room although it was far on into the
night. He found him sitting in a deserted house, writing, with a large
revolver by his side; for as Roon complains, even during the campaign
Bismarck would not give up his old custom of working all night and
sleeping till midday or later. Bismarck received the French Ambassador
with his wonted cordiality and the conversation was prolonged till three
or four o'clock in the morning, and continued on the following days.
Bismarck hoped that he had come with full powers to treat, or at least
with full information on the intentions of his Government; that was not
the case; he had no instructions except to use his influence to persuade
Prussia to moderation; Napoleon was far too much divided in his own mind
to be able to tell him anything further. Bismarck with his usual
frankness explained what he wished, laying much stress on the
annexations in North Germany; Benedetti, so little did he follow
Napoleon's thought, protested warmly against this. "We are not," he
said, "in the times of Frederick the Great." Bismarck then tried to
probe him on other matters; as before, he assumed that Napoleon's
support and good-will were not to be had for nothing. He took it as a
matter of course that if France was friendly to Prussia, she would
require some recompense. He had already instructed Goltz to enquire what
non-German compensation would be asked; he was much disturbed when
Benedetti met his overtures with silence; he feared that Napoleon had
some other plan. Benedetti in his report writes:

"Without any encouragement on my part, he attempted to prove to me that
the defeat of Austria permitted France and Prussia to modify their
territorial limits and to solve the greater part of the difficulties
which continued to menace the peace of Europe. I reminded him that there
were treaties and that the war which he desired to prevent would be the
first result of a policy of this kind. M. de Bismarck answered that I
misunderstood him, that France and Prussia united and resolved to
rectify their respective countries, binding themselves by solemn
eng