ted that Bismarck had promised him all
kinds of recompenses. No written agreement was made; that was reserved
for later negotiations, but there was a verbal understanding, which both
parties felt was binding. This was the pendant to the interview of
Plombieres. But Bismarck had improved on Cavour's example; he did not
want so much, he asked only for neutrality: the King of Prussia would
not be called upon, like Victor Emmanuel, to surrender the old
possessions of his House.
Bismarck returned to Berlin with his health invigorated by the Atlantic
winds and his spirits raised by success. The first step now was to
secure the help of Italy; he had seen Nigra, the Italian Minister, at
Paris, and told him that war was inevitable; he hoped he could reckon on
Italian alliance, but there was still, however, much ground for anxiety
that Austria might succeed in arranging affairs with Italy.
The relations of the four Powers at this time were very remarkable. All
turned on Venetia. The new Kingdom of Italy would not rest until it had
secured this province. Napoleon also was bound by honour to complete his
promise and "free Italy to the Adriatic"; neither his throne nor that
of his son would be secure if he failed to do so. A war between Austria
and Prussia would obviously afford the best opportunity, and his whole
efforts were therefore directed to preventing a reconciliation between
the two German Powers. His great fear was that Austria should come to
terms with Prussia, and surrender the Duchies on condition that Prussia
should guarantee her Italian possessions. When Bismarck visited Napoleon
at Biarritz, the first question of the Emperor was, "Have you guaranteed
Venetia to Austria?" It was the fear of this which caused his anger at
the Treaty of Gastein. On the other hand, Bismarck had his reasons for
anxiety. It was always possible that Austria, instead of coming to terms
with Prussia, might choose the other side; she might surrender Venetia
in order to obtain French and Italian support in a German war. The
situation indeed was this: Austria was liable at any moment to be
attacked by both Italy and Prussia; it would probably be beyond her
strength to resist both assailants at the same time. A wise statesman
would probably have made terms with one or the other. He would have
either surrendered Venetia, which was really a source of weakness, to
Italy, or agreed with Prussia over the Duchies and the German problem,
thereby gain
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