served in the Morea
in 1828, becoming captain in the following year. When the revolution of
1830 broke out he was stationed at Arras, and was the first officer of
his regiment to declare for the new order of things. In 1831 he was
removed from active duty in consequence of his declared republicanism,
but in 1832 he was recalled to the service and sent to Algeria. This
continued to be the main sphere of his activity for sixteen years, and
he won especial distinction in his fifteen months' command of the
exposed garrison of Tlemcen, a command for which he was selected by
Marshal Clausel (1836-1837), and in the defence of Cherchel (1840).
Almost every step of his promotion was gained on the field of battle,
and in 1844 the duc d'Aumale himself asked for Cavaignac's promotion to
the rank of _marechal de camp_. This was made in the same year, and he
held various district commands in Algeria up to 1848, when the
provisional government appointed him governor-general of the province
with the rank of general of division. The post of minister of war was
also offered to Cavaignac, but he refused it owing to the unwillingness
of the government to quarter troops in Paris, a measure which the
general held to be necessary for the stability of the new regime. On his
election to the National Assembly, however, Cavaignac returned to Paris.
When he arrived on the 17th of May he found the capital in an extremely
critical state. Several _emeutes_ had already taken place, and by the
22nd of June 1848 a formidable insurrection had been organized. The only
course now open to the National Assembly was to assert its authority by
force. Cavaignac, first as minister of war and then as dictator, was
called to the task of suppressing the revolt. It was no light task, as
the national guard was untrustworthy, regular troops were not at hand in
sufficient numbers, and the insurgents had abundant time to prepare
themselves. Variously estimated at from 30,000 to 60,000 men, well armed
and organized, they had entrenched themselves at every step behind
formidable barricades, and were ready to avail themselves of every
advantage that ferocity and despair could suggest to them. Cavaignac
failed perhaps to appreciate the political exigencies of the moment; as
a soldier he would not strike his blow until his plans were matured and
his forces sufficiently prepared. When the troops at last advanced in
three strong columns, every inch of ground was disputed, and th