t exist; if the
Government here was as earnest as it ought to be in its
contemplation of this war, but really was without the means of
prosecuting it; if it acknowledged and took its proper interest in
the possession of the Netherlands, and asked your assistance to
that object, only because they had exhausted all their own
resources, there might be great inducements to hope that, in
furnishing to them the supply which they wish, you might on your
side expect all the active effects which ought to be produced by
it; but I know not how to hope that a subsidy will give vigour to
their councils or enterprise to their armies; still less can I hope
that a subsidy, given for the preservation of the Netherlands, will
teach them to put a proper value upon those possessions on their
own account, though it certainly would teach them how highly you
value their retaining them on your account.

All M. de Thugut's conversation, even upon the idea of the subsidy
taking place, is evidently adverse to the prosecuting of the war in
the Netherlands; and even when the danger of Holland is urged as a
powerful argument for this course, he very coldly answers that,
supposing the French to succeed in Holland for a time, they would
be glad enough to relinquish it if the arms of the allies were
successful in the interior of France. How, then, can one easily
hope that the payment of a subsidy will reconcile views so
remote--as I apprehend these are--from the wishes of the English
Cabinet, or prevent much of thwarting and contradiction in the
operations of the campaign? I confess that I suspect this
disinclination to the defence of the Netherlands to arise, not only
from a habit of undervaluing them, but partly, too, from a
persuasion that the Maritime Powers must and will, at their own
expense, protect them; and partly, also, from a narrow and timid
view of collecting the whole Austrian force on the German frontier,
so as to be more immediately ready for the defence of the imperial
dominions, as well as to have less reason to fear in their jealousy
of the intentions of the King of Prussia.

Upon this latter point the difficulties are, perhaps, much more
likely to be increased than to be relieved, by transferring the
Prussian subsidy to the army of Austria, because the Co