e only means of salvation that appeared practicable.

With respect to the languor of the Austrian Government, and the
doubt whether even money will obtain from them decisive efforts, we
have strongly felt the force of all that you have stated on that
head. But we are inclined to flatter ourselves, that if we once
obtain so large a force as is mentioned in my despatch, and can put
that force, in addition to our own, under the absolute and supreme
direction of such a man as Lord Cornwallis, we shall at least be
able to say to ourselves, whatever be the result, that we have done
everything that it was possible to do; and without trying this
measure, I confess for one that I should not have that sentiment in
my mind. I lament that we have thought ourselves obliged to bring
forward the discussion of a precise barrier, and yet I do not see
how it could be avoided. But the impression may be very bad on
their minds, if we appear to be narrowing the benefits which they
are to derive from exertion, instead of animating them by the hope
of increased advantage. I have not dwelt on this point in my
despatch, as you mention that you intended to write further upon
it.

When the idea of transferring the subsidy was opened to me by
Starhemberg, from Merey's instructions it was expressly stated, as
a part of the plan, that the empire could be made to subsidize the
Prussian troops; and this agrees with every information we receive
on the subject, all which concur in stating the efforts of the
empire, particularly in money, as being very far below what they
could be brought to make by the joint exertions of Austria and
Prussia. But on my pressing Starhemberg for further detail on this
point, he has always avoided it, assuring me, whether truly or not,
that he found no particulars respecting it among Merey's papers.
You will see that in the despatch we make the whole dependent on a
complete and _bona fide_ execution of this point, and my language
to him has always been of the same nature. But I confess that it is
on this point that I feel the strongest apprehensions, and I much
fear that Austria will both be disposed to evade it, and, in truth,
unable to accomplish it. Should this be the case, the whole plan
must be abandoned; and we should, I believe, in that event, b