ed by him, of the military concert of the 26th July; you will
already have seen, in our despatch No. 5, our apprehensions of the
inconvenience of placing Clairfayt's army in any state of
dependance upon the Prussian line, as we are always afraid that the
Prussians may, by a nominal concert upon this subject, become a
real hindrance, and throw difficulties in the way of the proposed
enterprise for the relief of Valenciennes. In this view, therefore,
we had certainly rather have seen Lord Malmesbury remaining at
least till the movement in question had actually been carried into
effect; and the more so, as we have always kept their fears a
little quiet here, by promising that Lord Malmesbury, at Frankfort,
should look to and strictly watch the operations of Marshal
Mollendorff's army. I take for granted, however, that you will
provide as well as you can against the inconveniences which in this
shape may arise, and we shall likewise mention it to Lord M.

Ever, my dear brother,
Most affectionately yours,
T. G.

MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

(Private.) Vienna, Sept. 15th, 1794.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

You will receive enclosed with this a letter, which I had already
written before the arrival of your last despatches, and which can
only be useful by showing you all that occurred to me upon the
former view of the subject. The conditions which are now attached
to the two questions of loan and subsidy, appear certainly to be
the best which could have been imagined for promising a fair use of
the troops for which we are desired to pay, and would probably
appear to the country to be so, besides really furnishing all the
means which can be supplied to this great stake which we are
compelled to play for. What has passed upon these propositions, you
will have seen pretty amply in the public despatch, which is
written so much at length as to require no great additional
comment. It is manifest, that instead of complying with all the
conditions proposed, they could not easily be brought to consent to
any one of them. Upon the subject of command, there is a soreness
which would be an insuperable bar to the idea of a large combined
force (chiefly Austrian) acting under any English General; and yet
there is so little hope of their acting