me in this Correspondence
in the month of August. Supported by the patronage of Barras, whose
confidence in his talents and activity were so conspicuously justified
by the results, he had recently been appointed to the command of the
army of Italy, now augmented by large reinforcements. He was at this
period only twenty-six years of age, and had never seen a regular
engagement; but his genius inspired the highest hopes, and his
extraordinary success gave a completely new aspect to the war.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Dropmore, Aug. 14th, 1796.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I was extremely sorry to hear so indifferent an account of your
health, but I hope the worst of the attack is now over. I return
you the letter from this unfortunate King, whose restoration to the
throne of his ancestors is now, at least, as remote as that of
Charles II. ever was--I fear, indeed, a great deal more so. I have
heard no more particulars of the attempt to assassinate him, than
the account which the Duke de Harcourt showed me, and which was the
same which they afterwards put into the newspapers.

The Prince of Hohenlohe's language has always had a leaning to the
side of Austria and England; but long experience has satisfied me
that, from a Prussian General, language of this sort means no more
than to describe to which party in the Berlin politics he may
happen to be inclined. We have, however, now made a last effort to
ascertain this point, but with very little expectation of success.

I do not wonder that the Navy should wish for a Spanish war, nor
that they should be the only set of men in England who do so. I
trust it may still be avoided, though the result is certainly very
doubtful when treating with such a Court. The distribution of our
limited number of sailors, into ships of the line and frigate
force, is a very nice and delicate question; but as far as I can
flatter myself that I understand it--which is not very much--I have
always inclined more to the latter, and I think the experience of
this war is in favour of that opinion. The same circumstances would
surely operate still more strongly in the case of a war with Spain,
whose commerce offers more _prise_ than that of France, and whose
line-of-battle force, even separately--and still more if united
with French ships--ca