carried, and they give it pretty plainly to be understood, that
they mean to depend upon us for that object. Under this view, they
seem to me always disposed to consider the operations of the
Austrian army in another campaign as likely to be concentered for
efforts from the German frontier, by which means they will have a
more collected force more immediately applying to the Imperial
dominions, and better suited to the jealousies which they entertain
of the King of Prussia, but certainly not best adapted to the
defence of Holland, and the recovery of Brabant.

Perhaps I may be considered as carrying these suspicions too far,
but I own I cannot help fearing too, that the suggestion made by
them of mortgaging the Low Countries to us, is not as security for
the money in question in this and the next campaign, is not a _bona
fide_ offer of their best security, but is considered by them as a
fresh motive for interesting us in their possession of those
territories, and as contributing the more to make that object our
business, by either taking upon ourselves the whole defence of
them, or, what they rather look to, by our purchasing the cession
of them at the peace, by some of the acquisitions which Great
Britain has made in the war: a measure which they may have the more
hope for our concurrence in, if we have two millions lent out upon
the security only of the Austrians regaining those territories at
the peace.

Do not believe that these impressions are taken from any starving
principle of economy, or from a too timid apprehension of the
unpopularity of a subsidy in England; but be assured, that even if
there should be no difficulty at home as to this demand being
acquiesced in, I should retain the same doubts as to any
expectation of proportionate advantages resulting from it, and
should be inclined to believe that even if the whole amount of the
subsidy was to be expended, it might be more advantageously used in
the purchase of Hessians, Swiss, or any other such troops
absolutely at our disposal, in addition to the Austrians, than in
the proposed purchase of increased vigour and activity in the
government and army of this country: you cannot buy what they have
not to sell.

Sept. 14th, 1791.

The former part of this letter had alr