peration which we are looking
for, perhaps no difficulty could be much more serious than that of
engaging ourselves at home in an expense, the disappointment of
which might produce in the minds of the public an effect, both with
respect to the war itself and with respect to the Government which
supports it, of the most perilous description. It is very true that
great objects must sometimes be pursued at great hazards, and
nobody is more ready than I to acknowledge that a greater object
cannot be found than the successful prosecution of this war; but
the peculiar question of subsidy seems to me to apply chiefly to
the mode of carrying on the war, and, I would hope, not to the
entire decision of pursuing or abandoning it.

I will not again go over the same detail which I pursued in my
letter to the Duke of Portland, but satisfy myself with recalling
to your observation, that the Government here, in speaking of the
exertions which they should be driven to the necessity of making,
if the French should threaten the German empire, plainly admitted
that they do still possess resources capable of being applied to
such critical exigencies, and in this confession show pretty
plainly that nothing but the necessity of the case will drive them
to the use of those means. Is it not then probable that a much
greater exertion may be made by that necessity existing in our
refusal of subsidy, than will be made by such pecuniary assistance
being given, as may relieve them from the necessity of making any
exertion of their own?

If the immediate alarm on the side of Holland seems to be a
considerable inducement to the grant of the subsidy, in order to
interest Austria in that very important defence of which the
Netherlands make so essential a part, it should not, on the other
hand, escape notice, that all our observation on their language and
views would lead us very much to doubt how far they would
cordially concur in the defence of the Netherlands, even though
they might consent to do so in the words of their contract;
whatever value they may or may not themselves put upon the
possession of the Low Countries, they always argue and act under
the manifest persuasion, that the Maritime Powers are alone
interested enough in this point to secure its being ultimately