f York to certain ruin, if the winds and the circumstances of this
country had not permitted Lord Moira's army to arrive just (and
only just) in time to cover their retreat, and communication. These
points are all mysterious to us lookers-on, and perhaps not much
more clear to you at Vienna. The only point clear and indisputable
is, that we begun the campaign offensively in the south-west point
without securing West Flanders; that we undertook by defensive
positions to cover it; and notwithstanding the very slow progress
of the French, which gave us full and ample time, it was lost for
want of sufficient force on the western flank of our combined
force, and for want of co-operation, either of defensive retreat,
or of mutual support in a systematic evacuation of a country so
very tenable. Now, if all this is proposed to be cured by changing
the Commander, and by taking the Austrians into British pay, I fear
that I shall be one of the first to cry out against such a measure,
which cannot in the least tend to remove those difficulties, and
will superinduce many others on the continent, and others more
serious at home, to which you cannot be a stranger. If the object
be to add to our force, we do not accomplish it by changing the
Paymaster or Commander of the troops; but we may obtain a very
considerable force under our immediate and actual command, by
adding to the levies of French troops; or, in plain terms, by
raising an immense French army in British pay, who would not be
liable to be called off _a la Prussienne_ to schemes of plunder, or
possibly of home defence, in the moment in which they are the most
wanted by us. I have taken some pains to get information on this
subject; and I verily believe, that if we take the small remnant of
the Prince of Conde's army into our pay, with him at the head of it
as a foundation, we may in a very short time increase it to
twenty-five, or perhaps thirty thousand men, which, added to our
British, Hessian and Hanoverian army, would effectually support the
Dutch in covering Holland, and would enable us to make a very
serious diversion either in Normandy or in Poitou.

I have written upon this subject more at large than I at first
intended, but it is very difficult to compress it; and having found
it difficult to re