e emotional or the vulgar. It is serious and filled with
menaces of disaster when it is held by men thought fit to administer
the affairs of a nation or advise concerning its defence. The
third Dutch war may not have settled directly the position of
England in the maritime world; but it helped to place that country
above all other maritime states,--in the position, in fact, which
Great Britain, the United Kingdom, the British Empire, whichever
name may be given it, has retained up to the present. It also
manifested in a very striking form the efficacy of sea-power.
The United Provinces, though attacked by two of the greatest
monarchies in the world, France and England, were not destroyed.
Indeed, they preserved much of their political importance in
the State system of Europe. The Republic 'owed this astonishing
result partly to the skill of one or two men, but mainly to its
sea-power.' The effort, however, had undermined its strength
and helped forward its decline.

[Footnote 41: Mommsen, ii. p. 52.]

The war which was ended by the Peace of Ryswick in 1697 presents
two features of exceptional interest: one was the havoc wrought on
English commerce by the enemy; the other was Torrington's conduct
at and after the engagement off Beachy Head. Mahan discusses
the former with his usual lucidity. At no time has war against
commerce been conducted on a larger scale and with greater results
than during this period. We suffered 'infinitely more than in
any former war.' Many of our merchants were ruined; and it is
affirmed that the English shipping was reduced to the necessity
of sailing under the Swedish and Danish flags. The explanation is
that Louis XIV made great efforts to keep up powerful fleets. Our
navy was so fully occupied in watching these that no ships could
be spared to protect our maritime trade. This is only another way
of saying that our commerce had increased so largely that the
navy was not strong enough to look after it as well as oppose
the enemy's main force. Notwithstanding our losses we were on
the winning side in the conflict. Much misery and ruin had been
caused, but not enough to affect the issue of the war.

Torrington's proceedings in July 1690 were at the time the subject
of much angry debate. The debate, still meriting the epithet
angry, has been renewed within the last few years. The matter
has to be noticed here, because it involves the consideration of
a question of naval strategy which must