a tactician
Torrington was immeasurably ahead of his contemporaries. The
only English admirals who can be placed above him are Hawke and
Nelson. He paid the penalty of his pre-eminence: he could not
make ignorant men and dull men see the meaning or the advantages
of his proceedings. Mahan, who is specially qualified to do him
full justice, does not devote much space in his work to a
consideration of Torrington's case, evidently because he had
no sufficient materials before him on which to form a judgment.
The admiral's character had been taken away already by Macaulay,
who did have ample evidence before him. William III, with all his
fine qualities, did not possess a military genius quite equal
to that of Napoleon; and Napoleon, in naval strategy, was often
wrong. William III understood that subject even less than the
French emperor did; and his favourites were still less capable
of understanding it. Consequently Torrington's action has been
put down to jealousy of the Dutch. There have been people who
accused Nelson of being jealous of the naval reputation of
Caracciolo! The explanation of Torrington's conduct is this:--
He had a fleet so much weaker than Tourville's that he could
not fight a general action with the latter without a practical
certainty of getting a crushing defeat. Such a result would have
laid the kingdom open: a defeat of the allied fleet, says Mahan,
'if sufficiently severe, might involve the fall of William's
throne in England.' Given certain movements of the French fleet,
Torrington might have manoeuvred to slip past it to the westward
and join his force with that under Killigrew, which would make
him strong enough to hazard a battle. This proved impracticable.
There was then one course left. To retire before the French,
but not to keep far from them. He knew that, though not strong
enough to engage their whole otherwise unemployed fleet with any
hope of success, he would be quite strong enough to fight and
most likely beat it, when a part of it was trying either to deal
with our ships to the westward or to cover the disembarkation of
an invading army. He, therefore, proposed to keep his fleet 'in
being' in order to fall on the enemy when the latter would have
two affairs at the same time on his hands. The late Vice-Admiral
Colomb rose to a greater height than was usual even with him in
his criticism of this campaign. What Torrington did was merely
to reproduce on the sea what has been noticed d