ose who occupied them were protected,
not so much by their own strength of position, as by the complete
command over the North Sea held by the fleets that found shelter
in the fiords and firths.']

In the smaller operations of war temporary command of a particular
area of water may suffice for the success of an expedition, or
at least will permit the execution of the preliminary movements.
When the main fleet of a country is at a distance--which it ought
not to be except with the object of nearing the opposing fleet--a
small hostile expedition may slip across, say the Channel, throw
shells into a coast town or burn a fishing village, and get home
again unmolested. Its action would have no sort of influence on
the course of the campaign, and would, therefore, be useless. It
would also most likely lead to reprisals; and, if this process were
repeated, the war would probably degenerate into the antiquated
system of 'cross-raiding,' discarded centuries ago, not at all
for reasons of humanity, but because it became certain that war
could be more effectually waged in other ways. The nation in
command of the sea may resort to raiding to expedite the formal
submission of an already defeated enemy, as Russia did when at
war with Sweden in 1719; but in such a case the other side cannot
retaliate. Temporary command of local waters will also permit of
operations rather more considerable than mere raiding attacks;
but the duration of these operations must be adjusted to the
time available. If the duration of the temporary command is
insufficient the operation must fail. It must fail even if the
earlier steps have been taken successfully. Temporary command
of the Baltic in war might enable a German force to occupy an
Aland isle; but unless the temporary could be converted into
permanent command, Germany could make no use of the acquisition,
which in the end would revert as a matter of course to its former
possessors. The command of the English Channel, which Napoleon
wished to obtain when maturing his invasion project, was only
temporary. It is possible that a reminiscence of what had happened
in Egypt caused him to falter at the last; and that, quite
independently of the proceedings of Villeneuve, he hesitated to
risk a second battle of the Nile and the loss of a second army.
It may have been this which justified his later statement that he
did not really mean to invade England. In any case, the English
practice of fixing the sta