means of defence, and fear of the menaces of
the great First Consul then disposing of the resources of France,
aggrandised, pacified, and reinforced by alliances. The book being
what it is and coming whence it does, such a statement ought not
to be passed over. 'The desire for peace,' says an author so
easily accessible as J. R. Green, 'sprang from no sense of national
exhaustion. On the contrary, wealth had never increased so fast....
Nor was there any ground for despondency in the aspect of the
war itself.' This was written in 1875 by an author so singularly
free from all taint of Chauvinism that he expressly resolved that
his work 'should never sink into a drum and trumpet history.' A
few figures will be interesting and, it may be added, conclusive.
Between 1793 when the war began and 1802 when the Peace of Amiens
interrupted it, the public income of Great Britain increased from
L16,382,000 to L28,000,000, the war taxes not being included
in the latter sum. The revenue of France, notwithstanding her
territorial acquisitions, sank from L18,800,000 to L18,000,000.
The French exports and imports by sea were annihilated; whilst
the British exports were doubled and the imports increased more
than 50 per cent. The French Navy had at the beginning 73, at
the end of the war 39, ships of the line; the British began the
contest with 135 and ended it with 202. Even as regards the army,
the British force at the end of the war was not greatly inferior
numerically to the French. It was, however, much scattered, being
distributed over the whole British Empire. In view of the question
under discussion, no excuse need be given for adducing these
facts.

[Footnote 63: 1793-1805. _Projets_et_Tentatives_de_Debarquement_
_aux_Iles_Britanniques_, par Edouard Desbriere, Capitaine brevete
aux 1er Cuirassiers. Paris, Chapelot et Cie. 1900. (Publie sous la
direction de la section historique de l'Etat-Major de l'Armee.)]

Captain Desbriere in the present volume carries his collection
of documents down to the date at which the then General Bonaparte
gave up his connection with the flotilla that was being equipped
in the French Channel ports, and prepared to take command of
the expedition to Egypt. The volume therefore, in addition to
accounts of many projected, but never really attempted, descents
on the British Isles, gives a very complete history of Hoche's
expedition to Ireland; of the less important, but curious, descent
in Cardigan Ba