equired,
at least in the last of the three wars above mentioned. If all
the foreign mercantile marines at the present day, when nearly
all have been so largely increased, were to combine, they could
not furnish the number required after their own wants had been
satisfied. During the period under review some of the leading
commercial nations were at war with us; so that few, if any,
seamen could have come to us from them. Our custom-house statistics
indicate an increase in the shipping trade of the neutral nations
sufficient to have rendered it impossible for them to spare us
any much larger number of seamen. Therefore, it is extremely
difficult to resist the conclusion that during the wars the
composition of our merchant service remained nearly what it was
during peace. It contained a far from insignificant proportion
of foreigners; and that proportion was augmented, though by no
means enormously, whilst war was going on. This leads us to the
further conclusion that, if our merchant service supplied the
navy with many men, it could recover only a small part of the
number from foreign countries. In fact, any that it could give
it had to replace from our own population almost exclusively.

The question now to be considered is, What was the capacity of
the merchant service for supplying the demands of the navy? In
the year 1770 the number of seamen voted for the navy was 11,713.
Owing to a fear of a difficulty with Spain about the Falkland
Islands, the number for the following year was suddenly raised
to 31,927. Consequently, the increase was 20,214, which, added
to the 'waste' on the previous year, made the whole naval demand
about 21,000. We have not got statistics of the seamen of the
whole British Empire for this period, but we have figures which
will enable us to compute the number with sufficient accuracy
for the purpose in hand. In England and Wales there were some
59,000 seamen, and those of the rest of the empire amounted to
about 21,000. Large as the 'waste' was in the Royal Navy, it
was, and still is, much larger in the merchant service. We may
safely put it at 8 per cent. at least. Therefore, simply to keep
up its numbers--80,000--the merchant service would have had to
engage fully 6400 fresh hands. In view of these figures, it is
difficult to believe that it could have furnished the navy with
21,000 men, or, indeed, with any number approximating thereto.
It could not possibly have done so without restrictin