out of the struggle a great, and in a fair way of becoming the
greatest, naval power. It is this which prompted Vice-Admiral P.
H. Colomb to hold that there are various kinds of command, such
as 'absolute or assured,' 'temporary,' 'with definite ulterior
purpose,' &c. An explanation that would make all these terms
intelligible would be voluminous and is unnecessary here. It
will be enough to say that the absolute command--of attempts
to gain which, as Colomb tells us, the Anglo-Dutch wars were
the most complete example--is nothing but an attribute of the
nation whose power on the sea is paramount. It exists and may
be visible in time of peace. The command which, as said above,
expresses a definite strategical condition is existent only in
time of war. It can easily be seen that the former is essential to
an empire like the British, the parts of which are bound together
by maritime communications. Inability to keep these communications
open can have only one result, viz. the loss of the parts with
which communication cannot be maintained. Experience of war as
well as reason will have made it evident that inability to keep
open sea-communications cannot be limited to any single line,
because the inability must be due either to incapacity in the
direction of hostilities or insufficiency of force. If we have
not force enough to keep open all the communications of our widely
extended empire, or if--having force enough--we are too foolish
to employ it properly, we do not hold the command of the sea,
and the empire must fall if seriously attacked.
The strategic command of the sea in a particular war or campaign
has equal concern for all maritime belligerents. Before seeing
what it is, it will be well to learn on high authority what it is
not. Mahan says that command, or, to use his own term, 'control
of the sea, however real, does not imply that an enemy's single
ships or small squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot cross
more or less frequented tracts of ocean, make harassing descents
upon unprotected points of a long coast-line, enter blockaded
harbours. On the contrary, history has shown that such evasions
are always possible, to some extent, to the weaker party, however
great the inequality of naval strength.'[55] The Anglo-French
command of the sea in 1854-56, complete as it was, did not enable
the allies to intercept the Russian ships in the North-Western
Pacific, nor did that held by the Federals in the American
|