t along the Memphis and Charleston railroad
eastward. While there he had a most excellent map prepared showing all
the roads and streams in the surrounding country. He was also
personally familiar with the ground, so that I deferred very much to him
in my plans for the approach. We had cars enough to transport all of
General Ord's command, which was to go by rail to Burnsville, a point on
the road about seven miles west of Iuka. From there his troops were to
march by the north side of the railroad and attack Price from the
north-west, while Rosecrans was to move eastward from his position south
of Corinth by way of the Jacinto road. A small force was to hold the
Jacinto road where it turns to the north-east, while the main force
moved on the Fulton road which comes into Iuka further east. This plan
was suggested by Rosecrans.
Bear Creek, a few miles to the east of the Fulton road, is a formidable
obstacle to the movement of troops in the absence of bridges, all of
which, in September, 1862, had been destroyed in that vicinity. The
Tennessee, to the north-east, not many miles away, was also a formidable
obstacle for an army followed by a pursuing force. Ord was on the
north-west, and even if a rebel movement had been possible in that
direction it could have brought only temporary relief, for it would have
carried Price's army to the rear of the National forces and isolated it
from all support. It looked to me that, if Price would remain in Iuka
until we could get there, his annihilation was inevitable.
On the morning of the 18th of September General Ord moved by rail to
Burnsville, and there left the cars and moved out to perform his part of
the programme. He was to get as near the enemy as possible during the
day and intrench himself so as to hold his position until the next
morning. Rosecrans was to be up by the morning of the 19th on the two
roads before described, and the attack was to be from all three quarters
simultaneously. Troops enough were left at Jacinto and Rienzi to detain
any cavalry that Van Dorn might send out to make a sudden dash into
Corinth until I could be notified. There was a telegraph wire along the
railroad, so there would be no delay in communication. I detained cars
and locomotives enough at Burnsville to transport the whole of Ord's
command at once, and if Van Dorn had moved against Corinth instead of
Iuka I could have thrown in reinforcements to the number of 7,000 or
8,000
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