fore, to abandon my campaign
into the interior with Columbus as a base, and returned to La Grange and
Grand Junction destroying the road to my front and repairing the road to
Memphis, making the Mississippi river the line over which to draw
supplies. Pemberton was falling back at the same time.

The moment I received the news of Van Dorn's success I sent the cavalry
at the front back to drive him from the country. He had start enough to
move north destroying the railroad in many places, and to attack several
small garrisons intrenched as guards to the railroad. All these he
found warned of his coming and prepared to receive him. Van Dorn did
not succeed in capturing a single garrison except the one at Holly
Springs, which was larger than all the others attacked by him put
together. Murphy was also warned of Van Dorn's approach, but made no
preparations to meet him. He did not even notify his command.

Colonel Murphy was the officer who, two months before, had evacuated
Iuka on the approach of the enemy. General Rosecrans denounced him for
the act and desired to have him tried and punished. I sustained the
colonel at the time because his command was a small one compared with
that of the enemy--not one-tenth as large--and I thought he had done
well to get away without falling into their hands. His leaving large
stores to fall into Price's possession I looked upon as an oversight and
excused it on the ground of inexperience in military matters. He should,
however, have destroyed them. This last surrender demonstrated to my
mind that Rosecrans' judgment of Murphy's conduct at Iuka was correct.
The surrender of Holly Springs was most reprehensible and showed either
the disloyalty of Colonel Murphy to the cause which he professed to
serve, or gross cowardice.

After the war was over I read from the diary of a lady who accompanied
General Pemberton in his retreat from the Tallahatchie, that the retreat
was almost a panic. The roads were bad and it was difficult to move the
artillery and trains. Why there should have been a panic I do not see.
No expedition had yet started down the Mississippi River. Had I known
the demoralized condition of the enemy, or the fact that central
Mississippi abounded so in all army supplies, I would have been in
pursuit of Pemberton while his cavalry was destroying the roads in my
rear.

After sending cavalry to drive Van Dorn away, my next order was to
dispatch all the wagons we h