t
through personal or political influence, my belief is that I would have
feared to undertake any plan of my own conception, and would probably
have awaited direct orders from my distant superiors. Persons obtaining
important commands by application or political influence are apt to keep
a written record of complaints and predictions of defeat, which are
shown in case of disaster. Somebody must be responsible for their
failures.

With all the pressure brought to bear upon them, both President Lincoln
and General Halleck stood by me to the end of the campaign. I had never
met Mr. Lincoln, but his support was constant.

At last the waters began to recede; the roads crossing the peninsula
behind the levees of the bayous, were emerging from the waters; the
troops were all concentrated from distant points at Milliken's Bend
preparatory to a final move which was to crown the long, tedious and
discouraging labors with success.

I had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to a
point below Vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to the
possible but not expected success of some one of the expedients resorted
to for the purpose of giving us a different base. This could not be
undertaken until the waters receded. I did not therefore communicate
this plan, even to an officer of my staff, until it was necessary to
make preparations for the start. My recollection is that Admiral Porter
was the first one to whom I mentioned it. The co-operation of the navy
was absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation) of
such an enterprise. I had no more authority to command Porter than he
had to command me. It was necessary to have part of his fleet below
Vicksburg if the troops went there. Steamers to use as ferries were
also essential. The navy was the only escort and protection for these
steamers, all of which in getting below had to run about fourteen miles
of batteries. Porter fell into the plan at once, and suggested that he
had better superintend the preparation of the steamers selected to run
the batteries, as sailors would probably understand the work better than
soldiers. I was glad to accept his proposition, not only because I
admitted his argument, but because it would enable me to keep from the
enemy a little longer our designs. Porter's fleet was on the east side
of the river above the mouth of the Yazoo, entirely concealed from the
enemy by the dense forests that intervene