uary. The Indianola was superior to all the others in
armament, and probably would have destroyed them or driven them away,
but for her encumbrance. As it was she fought them for an hour and a
half, but, in the dark, was struck seven or eight times by the ram and
other vessels, and was finally disabled and reduced to a sinking
condition. The armament was thrown overboard and the vessel run ashore.
Officers and crew then surrendered.
I had started McClernand with his corps of four divisions on the 29th of
March, by way of Richmond, Louisiana, to New Carthage, hoping that he
might capture Grand Gulf before the balance of the troops could get
there; but the roads were very bad, scarcely above water yet. Some
miles from New Carthage the levee to Bayou Vidal was broken in several
places, overflowing the roads for the distance of two miles. Boats were
collected from the surrounding bayous, and some constructed on the spot
from such material as could be collected, to transport the troops across
the overflowed interval. By the 6th of April McClernand had reached New
Carthage with one division and its artillery, the latter ferried through
the woods by these boats. On the 17th I visited New Carthage in person,
and saw that the process of getting troops through in the way we were
doing was so tedious that a better method must be devised. The water
was falling, and in a few days there would not be depth enough to use
boats; nor would the land be dry enough to march over. McClernand had
already found a new route from Smith's plantation where the crevasse
occurred, to Perkins' plantation, eight to twelve miles below New
Carthage. This increased the march from Milliken's Bend from
twenty-seven to nearly forty miles. Four bridges had to be built across
bayous, two of them each over six hundred feet long, making about two
thousand feet of bridging in all. The river falling made the current in
these bayous very rapid, increasing the difficulty of building and
permanently fastening these bridges; but the ingenuity of the "Yankee
soldier" was equal to any emergency. The bridges were soon built of
such material as could be found near by, and so substantial were they
that not a single mishap occurred in crossing all the army with
artillery, cavalry and wagon trains, except the loss of one siege gun
(a thirty-two pounder). This, if my memory serves me correctly, broke
through the only pontoon bridge we had in all our march acros
|