imes their
number and still left a sufficient garrison in the works about Corinth
to hold them. He came near success, some of his troops penetrating the
National lines at least once, but the works that were built after
Halleck's departure enabled Rosecrans to hold his position until the
troops of both McPherson and Hurlbut approached towards the rebel front
and rear. The enemy was finally driven back with great slaughter: all
their charges, made with great gallantry, were repulsed. The loss on
our side was heavy, but nothing to compare with Van Dorn's. McPherson
came up with the train of cars bearing his command as close to the enemy
as was prudent, debarked on the rebel flank and got in to the support of
Rosecrans just after the repulse. His approach, as well as that of
Hurlbut, was known to the enemy and had a moral effect. General
Rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although I had
given specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue the
moment the enemy was repelled. He did not do so, and I repeated the
order after the battle. In the first order he was notified that the
force of 4,000 men which was going to his assistance would be in great
peril if the enemy was not pursued.

General Ord had joined Hurlbut on the 4th and being senior took command
of his troops. This force encountered the head of Van Dorn's retreating
column just as it was crossing the Hatchie by a bridge some ten miles
out from Corinth. The bottom land here was swampy and bad for the
operations of troops, making a good place to get an enemy into. Ord
attacked the troops that had crossed the bridge and drove them back in a
panic. Many were killed, and others were drowned by being pushed off
the bridge in their hurried retreat. Ord followed and met the main
force. He was too weak in numbers to assault, but he held the bridge
and compelled the enemy to resume his retreat by another bridge higher
up the stream. Ord was wounded in this engagement and the command
devolved on Hurlbut.

Rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning of the 5th and then
took the wrong road. Moving in the enemy's country he travelled with a
wagon train to carry his provisions and munitions of war. His march was
therefore slower than that of the enemy, who was moving towards his
supplies. Two or three hours of pursuit on the day of battle, without
anything except what the men carried on their persons, would have been
worth m