e passive matter, and
the end of the builder is to introduce into matter the likeness of
his art. Whatever good ensues from this, if it be intended, may be
called the remote end of the agent. Now just as in things made,
external matter is fashioned by art, so in things done, human deeds
are fashioned by prudence. Accordingly we must conclude that the
brave man intends as his proximate end to reproduce in action a
likeness of his habit, for he intends to act in accordance with his
habit: but his remote end is happiness or God.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the First
Objection proceeds as though the very essence of a habit were its
end, instead of the likeness of the habit in act, as stated. The
other two objections consider the ultimate end.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 8]

Whether the Brave Man Delights in His Act?

Objection 1: It seems that the brave man delights in his act. For
"delight is the unhindered action of a connatural habit" (Ethic. x,
4, 6, 8). Now the brave deed proceeds from a habit which acts after
the manner of nature. Therefore the brave man takes pleasure in his
act.

Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. 5:22, "But the fruit of
the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," says that deeds of virtue are
called "fruits because they refresh man's mind with a holy and pure
delight." Now the brave man performs acts of virtue. Therefore he
takes pleasure in his act.

Obj. 3: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. Now the
brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue than for his own
body, which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore the delight
in the good of virtue banishes the pain of the body; and consequently
the brave man does all things with pleasure.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "the
brave man seems to have no delight in his act."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 31, AA. 3, 4, 5) where we
were treating of the passions, pleasure is twofold; one is bodily,
resulting from bodily contact, the other is spiritual, resulting from
an apprehension of the soul. It is the latter which properly results
from deeds of virtue, since in them we consider the good of reason.
Now the principal act of fortitude is to endure, not only certain
things that are unpleasant as apprehended by the soul--for instance,
the loss of bodily life, which the virtuous man loves not only as a
natural good,