rance implies length of time, whereas aggression is
consistent with sudden movements; and it is more difficult to remain
unmoved for a long time, than to be moved suddenly to something
arduous. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some hurry
to meet danger, yet fly when the danger is present; this is not the
behavior of a brave man."

Reply Obj. 2: Endurance denotes indeed a passion of the body, but an
action of the soul cleaving most resolutely (_fortissime_) to good,
the result being that it does not yield to the threatening passion of
the body. Now virtue concerns the soul rather than the body.

Reply Obj. 3: He that endures fears not, though he is confronted with
the cause of fear, whereas this cause is not present to the aggressor.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 7]

Whether the Brave Man Acts for the Sake of the Good of His Habit?

Objection 1: It seems that the brave man does not act for the sake of
the good of his habit. For in matters of action the end, though first
in intention, is last in execution. Now the act of fortitude, in the
order of execution, follows the habit of fortitude. Therefore it is
impossible for the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his
habit.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "We love virtues for
the sake of happiness, and yet some make bold to counsel us to be
virtuous," namely by saying that we should desire virtue for its own
sake, "without loving happiness. If they succeed in their endeavor,
we shall surely cease to love virtue itself, since we shall no longer
love that for the sake of which alone we love virtue." But fortitude
is a virtue. Therefore the act of fortitude is directed not to
fortitude but to happiness.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "fortitude
is love ready to bear all things for God's sake." Now God is not the
habit of fortitude, but something better, since the end must needs be
better than what is directed to the end. Therefore the brave man does
not act for the sake of the good of his habit.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "to the
brave man fortitude itself is a good": and such is his end.

_I answer that,_ An end is twofold: proximate and ultimate. Now the
proximate end of every agent is to introduce a likeness of that
agent's form into something else: thus the end of fire in heating is
to introduce the likeness of its heat into som