ottom.

_General Staff_.--In order to direct the drills of a fleet toward
some worthy end, that end itself must be clearly seen; and in order
that it may be clearly seen, it first must be discovered. The end
does not exist as a bright mark in the sky, but as the answer to a
difficult problem; it cannot be found by guessing or by speculating
or by groping in the dark. Strategy says that the best way in which
to find it is by the "estimate of the situation" method.

Owing to the fact that the commander-in-chief and all his personnel
are, by the nature of the conditions surrounding them, on executive
duty, the working out of the end in view of any extensive drills
seems the task of the Navy Department; while the task of attaining
it seems to belong to the commander-in-chief. Owing to the present
stage of electrical progress, the Navy Department has better means of
ascertaining the whole naval situation than has the commander-in-chief,
and if officers (General Staff) be stationed at the department
to receive and digest all the information received, and decide
on the best procedure in each contingency as it arises, the Navy
Department can then give the commander-in-chief the information he
requires and general instructions how to proceed.

This does not mean that the department would "interfere" with the
commander-in-chief, but simply that it would assist him. The area
of discretion of the commander-in-chief should not be invaded; for
if it be invaded, not only may orders be given without knowledge
of certain facts in the commander-in-chief's possession, but the
commander-in-chief will have his difficulties increased by the very
people who are trying to help him. He may be forced into disobeying
orders, a most disturbing thing to have to do; and he will surely
be placed in a position of continuous doubt as to what is expected
of him.

Of course, it must be realized that the difficulties of co-operating
with a commander-in-chief at sea, by means of even the most expert
General Staff, are of the highest order. It is hard to imagine any
task more difficult. It must be accomplished, however, or else
there will be danger all the time that the commander-in-chief will
act as he would not act if he had all the information that the
department had. This suggests at once that the proper office of
the department is merely to give the commander-in-chief information
and let him act on his own judgment. True in a measure; but the
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