hine having been designed as to both personnel and
material, strategy has nothing to do with the material in preparing
the machine for use, because the material parts are already prepared,
and it is the work of engineering to keep those material parts in
a state of continual preparedness.

It must be noted, however, that the naval machine differs from
most material machines in that its various parts, material as well
as personnel, are continually being replaced by newer parts, and
added to by parts of novel kinds. Strategy must be consulted, of
course, in designing the characteristics of the newer and the novel
parts; but this work properly belongs in the designing stage, and
not in the preparation stage.

Strategy's work, therefore, in preparing the naval machine for
work consists wholly in preparing the personnel. This preparing
may be divided into two parts--preparing the existing fleet already
mobilized and preparing the rest of the navy.

_Preparing the Fleet_.--The fleet itself is always ready. This
does not mean that, in time of profound peace, every ship in the
fleet has all its men on board, its chain hove short, and its engines
ready to turn over at a moment's notice; but it does mean that this
condition is always approximated in whatever degree the necessities
of the moment exact. Normally, it is not necessary to keep all the
men on board; but whenever, or if ever, it becomes so necessary,
the men can be kept on board and everything made ready for instant
use. It is perfectly correct, therefore, to say that, so far as it
may be necessary, a fleet in active commission is always ready.

_Training_.--Before this state of readiness can be attained, however,
a great deal of training has to be carried out; and this training
must naturally be designed and prosecuted solely to attain this
end. Unless this end be held constantly in view, and unless the
methods of training be adapted to attain it, the training cannot
possibly be effective. To go from any point to another point, one
must proceed in the correct direction. If he proceeds in another
direction, he will miss the point.

The training of the fleet naturally must be in doing the things
which the fleet would have to do in war. To decide what things
these will probably be, resort must be had to the teachings of
history, especially the most recent history, and to the teachings
of the war problem, the chart maneuver, and the game-board.

The part of the per