iscovered to co-exist in nature. And our ideas being thus true,
though not perhaps very exact copies, are yet the subjects of real (as
far as we have any) knowledge of them. Which (as has been already shown)
will not be found to reach very far: but so far as it does, it will
still be real knowledge. Whatever ideas we have, the agreement we
find they have with others will still be knowledge. If those ideas be
abstract, it will be general knowledge. But to make it real concerning
substances, the ideas must be taken from the real existence of things.
Whatever simple ideas have been found to co-exist in any substance,
these we may with confidence join together again, and so make abstract
ideas of substances. For whatever have once had an union in nature, may
be united again.

13. In our inquiries about Substances, we must consider Ideas, and not
confine our Thoughts to Names, or Species supposed set out by Names.

This, if we rightly consider, and confine not our thoughts and abstract
ideas to names, as if there were, or could be no other SORTS of things
than what known names had already determined, and, as it were, set out,
we should think of things with greater freedom and less confusion than
perhaps we do. It would possibly be thought a bold paradox, if not a
very dangerous falsehood, if I should say that some CHANGELINGS, who
have lived forty years together, without any appearance of reason, are
something between a man and a beast: which prejudice is founded upon
nothing else but a false supposition, that these two names, man and
beast, stand for distinct species so set out by real essences, that
there can come no other species between them: whereas if we will
abstract from those names, and the supposition of such specific essences
made by nature, wherein all things of the same denominations did exactly
and equally partake; if we would not fancy that there were a certain
number of these essences, wherein all things, as in moulds, were cast
and formed; we should find that the idea of the shape, motion, and life
of a man without reason, is as much a distinct idea, and makes as much a
distinct sort of things from man and beast, as the idea of the shape of
an ass with reason would be different from either that of man or beast,
and be a species of an animal between, or distinct from both.

14. Objection against a Changeling being something between a Man and
Beast, answered.

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